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SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Can an Employer Be Held Strictly Liable for a
Supervisor's Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
When There Has Been a Quid but No Quo?
by Jay E. Grenig
PREVIEW of United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 474-478. © 1998 American Bar Association.
Jay E. Grenig is
professor of law at
Marquette University
Law School, Milwaukee, WI;
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IssuE
Can a claim of a supervisor's quid
pro quo sexual harassment be
asserted against the employer when
the victim neither submitted to the
sexual advances of the harasser nor
suffered any tangible adverse effects
with respect to the compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment as a consequence
of refusing to submit to the
harassment?
FACTS
Kimberly Ellerth interviewed in
March 1993 for a marketing job
with the mattress ticking division of
Burlington Industries ("Burlington").
The interview went well and she
was invited back for a second inter-
view with Theodore Slowik, vice
president of Sales and Marketing.
Ellerth alleges Slowik asked her a
number of disturbing questions dur-
ing the interview. As an example,
Ellerth says Slowik asked her if she
and her husband were planning on
having a family and were "practic-
ing" at it. Ellerth also claims Slowik
stared conspicuously at her breasts
and legs throughout the interview.
About a week after the Slowik
interview, Ellerth was offered and
accepted the position of merchan-
dising assistant in Burlington's office
in Chicago, Illinois. In that position
Ellerth reported to Burlington's
national accounts manager who
reported to Slowik. The national
accounts manager and Ellerth
were the only two employees in
the Chicago office.
Slowik, though based in New York
City, came to the Chicago office
one or two days every month or
two. When Slowik was in Chicago,
Ellerth was required to see him
on a regular basis. Ellerth also saw
Slowik at Burlington's corporate
offices in Greensboro, North
Carolina, and on training trips to
New York City and San Francisco,
California.
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Ellerth also talked with Slowik
by telephone about once a week.
According to Ellerth, her encounters
with Slowik were characterized by
a constant barrage of sexual com-
ments, innuendo, and occasionally
more.
Ellerth claims Slowik telephoned
her before she traveled to New York
City for a week of training and
spoke suggestively to her. While in
New York City, Ellerth asserts
Slowik had several conversations
with her, two of which were pro-
longed. In the first conversation,
Ellerth says Slowik told a number
of off-color, offensive jokes.
A second conversation took place
over a business lunch with Slowik
and another Burlington executive.
Ellerth contends Slowik again told a
number of sexually offensive jokes
and rubbed her knee under the
table. On leaving the restaurant,
Ellerth says Slowik and the other
executive walked several feet behind
her with Slowik commenting, "You
have got great legs, Kim." When she
returned to the office, Ellerth says
she reported to two other employ-
ees that Slowik and the other execu-
tive had been loud, obnoxious, rude,
and offensive during lunch.
Slowik, according to Ellerth, contin-
ued making sexually offensive com-
ments when he and Ellerth were
together. After a business dinner in
Greensboro in the summer of 1993,
Ellerth asserts Slowik invited her to
join him in the lounge of the hotel
where both were staying, and she
felt obliged to accept. While in the
lounge, Ellerth claims Slowik com-
mented on the anatomy and skimpy
outfits of the female band members.
Ellerth further alleges Slowik looked
at her breasts and said, "You are a
little lacking in that area, aren't you,
Kim?" Ellerth says that when she
did not respond, Slowik told her
that she "ought to loosen up"
and continued to stare at her
chest and legs.
Ellerth maintains that as she and
Slowik left the lounge, his remarks
became more threatening. She
quotes him as saying, "You know,
Kim, I could make your job very
hard or very easy at Burlington."
Ellerth alleges that she interpreted
the comment to mean that she
would have to have sex with Slowik
to succeed at Burlington.
Ellerth says that after the summer
1993 Greensboro trip, Slowik began
telephoning her more frequently.
The calls, though brief, normally
included sexually harassing com-
ments. According to Ellerth, Slowik
would talk about her body and ask
about her "practice" to have a
family. She claims that on several
occasions Slowik refused to give her
special permission to do something
for a customer until she described
her clothing to him.
Ellerth states Slowik suggested that
her job would be much easier if she
wore shorter skirts. She asserts that
every time she was on the telephone
with Slowik, she "ended up almost
in tears."
Ellerth claims her resistance to
Slowik's overtures did not deter
him. Thus, when Ellerth interviewed
in 1994 with Slowik for a promo-
tion, he rubbed her knee with his
hand while asking if the frequent
travel associated with the new
position would make her husband
miss her.
Ellerth, however, was promoted in
March 1994; apparently, Slowik
recommended the promotion.
Approximately two months after
being promoted, Burlington asserts
that Ellerth's direct supervisor
received complaints about her work.
After the supervisor discussed the
complaints with Ellerth, Ellerth
left a message on her supervisor's
answering machine in May 1994
telling the supervisor that she was
quitting. She sent him a letter by
facsimile to the same effect.
Ellerth's original letter of resignation
included references to Slowik's
alleged harassment of her, among
them the following: "What I did not
want to mention to you was the fact
that Ted had harassed me in the
past and I simply ignored him to
save my job;" "needless to say these
incidents could be seen as sexual
harassment;" and "what a shame
that one man can have such an
influence."
Ellerth, on the advice of her hus-
band, covered up the references to
Slowik's comments with correction
fluid, and the letter as transmitted
showed the blank spaces from the
redaction. Three weeks later, Ellerth
sent her supervisor a more complete
explanation in a letter that said in
part: "Before I was hired, you and
I spoke about the reasons why Ted
didn't feel comfortable around me.
I told you he had said and done
some sexually inappropriate things
to me in the past. What I didn't tell
you was that he had on two occa-
sions patted my rear and every time
he saw me he looked me up and
down like a piece of meat."
At all relevant times Burlington had
a sexual-harassment policy in force.
Burlington's policy provided that
"the company will not tolerate any
form of sexual harassment in the
workplace.... If you have any
questions or problems, or if you
feel you have been discriminated
against, you are encouraged to
talk to your supervisor or human
resources representative or use the
grievance procedure promptly."
(Continued on Page 476)
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Ellerth acknowledges knowing that
Burlington had a policy against
sexual harassment but says she was
unaware of how vigorously it was
enforced. Ellerth claims that both
she and her husband feared her job
would be jeopardized if she com-
plained about Slowik more than she
already had. Ellerth did not use the
grievance procedure or complain to
her direct supervisors.
Ellerth filed a sexual-harassment
complaint against Burlington with
the Illinois Department of Human
Rights and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (the
"EEOC") on October 12, 1994.
Ellerth alleged that she felt "com-
pelled to resign ... due to contin-
ued the [sic] hostile offensive envi-
ronment and abusive work environ-
ment created by Slowik's sexual
harassment and my opposition to
sexual harassment by Slowik."
The EEOC did not take on Ellerth's
case but did issue her a right-to-sue
letter on November 30, 1994.
Ellerth then filed suit against
Burlington in federal district court.
(Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 ["Title VII"], an
individual alleging employment
discrimination cannot file suit with-
out first filing a complaint with the
EEOC. The EEOC, however, is not
equipped to pursue all legitimate
claims of employment discrimina-
tion it receives. With respect to
most complaints, the EEOC briefly
investigates and then issues the
complainant a right-to-sue letter;
the letter authorizes the com-
plainant to proceed in court.)
Burlington moved for summary
judgment (see Glossary). Viewing
Ellerth's complaint as alleging
hostile-environment sexual harass-
ment, the district court granted
Burlington's motion, concluding that
Burlington had no knowledge of
Slowik's misconduct and thus was
not responsible for it. Viewing
Ellerth's complaint as alleging
quid pro quo sexual harassment,
the court held that Burlington could
not be held liable when there was
no evidence Slowik withheld tangi-
ble employment benefits because
Ellerth refused his advances.
912 F. Supp. 1101 (N.D.Ill. 1996).
Ellerth appealed to the Seventh
Circuit, arguing that her complaint
was sufficiently broad to encompass
quid pro quo sexual harassment as
well as hostile-environment sexual
harassment. She also argued that
the district court erred in its
analysis of the agency principles
applicable to the case.
A three-judge panel held that
Ellerth's allegations and the materi-
als she presented in opposition to
Burlington's motion for summary
judgment raised a genuine issue
of material fact on her claim of
quid pro quo sexual harassment.
102 F.3d 848 (7th Cir. 1997).
Burlington's petition for rehearing
in banc (see Glossary) was granted,
and the decision of the panel was
vacated. In a per curiam decision
(see Glossary) containing eight
separate opinions, the Seventh
Circuit reversed the district court
and held that employers may be
strictly liable under Title VII for
quid pro quo sexual harassment
even if the harassed employee
neither submitted to a supervisor's
sexual advances nor suffered any
adverse employment consequences
as a result of refusing to submit.
123 F.3d 490 (7th Cir. 1997).
The court did not address Ellerth's
claim of hostile-environment sexual
harassment, finding it waived.
The Supreme Court granted
Burlington's petition for a writ of
certiorari and now reviews the
Seventh Circuit's in banc ruling.
118 S. Ct. 876 (1998).
CASE ANALYSIS
Title VII makes it unlawful "for
an employer ... to discriminate
against any individual with respect
to his ... conditions ... of employ-
ment, because of such individual's
... sex .... " 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1). It is well established that
this prohibition encompasses sexual
harassment in the workplace.
For analytical purposes, courts
have created two categories of
sexual harassment: quid pro quo
harassment and hostile-environ-
ment harassment. Quid pro quo
sexual harassment occurs when
an employer conditions tangible
employment benefits on an employ-
ee's submission to sexual demands.
Hostile-environment sexual harass-
ment occurs when the actions of a
supervisor or coworker have the
purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with an employee's
work performance or create an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive
work environment.
The distinction between quid pro quo
sexual harassment (which is always
perpetrated by a supervisor) and
hostile-environment sexual harass-
ment perpetrated by a supervisor
often is blurred. However, courts
typically treat the two categories of
harassment differently in terms of
imposing liability on the employer.
In cases involving quid pro quo
harassment, courts routinely hold
the employer strictly liable - liable
without fault - for the supervisor's
misconduct.
Employer liability is treated differ-
ently in hostile-environment cases
decided after the Supreme Court
handed down its decision in Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986). In Meritor, the
Court confirmed that sexual harass-
ment is a form of sex discrimination
prohibited by Title VII. Holding that
Issue No. 7476
actionable sexual harassment could
exist if it were sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of
employment, the Court declined to
determine when an employer could
be held liable for a supervisor's
hostile-environment sexual
harassment.
The Meritor Court stated only that
it agreed with the EEOC's position
that Congress wanted courts to look
to agency principles for guidance in
this area. "While such ... principles
may not be transferable in all their
particulars to Title VII, Congress'
decision to define 'employer' to
include any 'agent' of an employer,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), surely evinces
an intent to place some limits on
the acts of employees for which
employers under Title VII are to be
held responsible. For this reason,
we hold that the court of appeals
erred in concluding that employers
are always automatically liable for
sexual harassment by their supervi-
sors .... For the same reason,
absence of notice to an employer
does not necessarily insulate that
employer from liability." 477 U.S. at
72. Indeed, the Court rejected the
employer's argument that "the mere
existence of a grievance procedure
and a policy against discrimination,
coupled with [the employee's] fail-
ure to invoke that procedure" insu-
lated it from liability. 477 U.S. at 72.
Burlington argues that the strict-
liability standard used by the
Seventh Circuit in Ellerth's incom-
plete quid pro quo claim is incon-
sistent with the Court's holding
in Meritor. Burlington says that a
strict-liability standard is particular-
ly inappropriate in quid pro quo
sexual-harassment claims predicat-
ed on mere unfulfilled threats
because employers have no effective
means of monitoring the "noncom-
pany acts" of their supervisors.
According to Burlington, in the
absence of a showing of economic
harm to the victim, strict liability
places an impossible burden on
employers while at the same time
encroaching on employee privacy.
Burlington maintains that Ellerth
must show she submitted to
Slowik's inappropriate sexual
advances or that adverse job
consequences resulted from her
failure to do so. Burlington reasons
that when a supervisor threatens
retaliation due to an employee's
rejection of his or her sexual
advances but fails to act on the
threats, the supervisor has not
actually misused any authority
delegated by the employer; at
most, the supervisor has only
contemplated such misuse.
Ellerth responds that the federal
appeals courts have uniformly
imposed strict liability on employers
for quid pro quo sexual harassment
regardless of economic injury to the
victim. She also contends that a
majority of the appeals courts to
have addressed the issue have held
or acknowledged that Title VII does
not require an additional showing of
economic injury in quid pro quo
sexual-harassment cases.
Ellerth contends an employer should
be strictly liable for quid pro quo
sexual harassment whenever a
supervisor with actual or apparent
authority over the employee propos-
es to provide employment benefits
in return for the employee's accep-
tance of the supervisor's sexual
advances or threatens to withhold
benefits if the advances are refused.
That, insists Ellerth, is exactly what
she encountered with Slowik. Says
Ellerth, Slowik had actual authority
to threaten her with benefits or
adverse consequences, and he
certainly had the apparent
authority to do so.
SIGNIFICANCE
There is a conflict among the feder-
al appeals courts over the elements
of a quid pro quo sexual-harass-
ment claim. Some appeals courts
require the plaintiff in such a case
to prove the harassment was tied to
tangible consequences in the terms
and conditions of the plaintiff's
employment; others hold the threat
of tangible consequences is enough.
The Seventh Circuit falls into the
second camp, holding in Ellerth's
case that a supervisor's threat of
retaliation linked to sexual advances
is sufficient to state a quid pro quo
sexual-harassment claim even if the
employee did not submit to the
advances and suffered no adverse
job consequences. Also in this camp
are the Third and Ninth Circuits.
Both courts have intimated that
quid pro quo sexual harassment
occurs whenever a supervisor
intertwines a request for the perfor-
mance of sexual favors with a dis-
cussion of actual or potential job
benefits or detriments. Robinson v.
City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286
(3d Cir. 1997) (whether employee
submits to or rebuffs sexual
advances, a quid pro quo violation
occurs at the time an employee is
told his or her compensation or
other job benefit is dependent on
submission to unwelcome sexual
advances); Heyne v. Caruso, 69 F.3d
1475 (9th Cir. 1995) (same).
The First, Fourth, Fifth, Tenth,
Eleventh, and District of Columbia
Circuits have taken the opposite
view and have held that quid pro quo
sexual harassment requires proof of
tangible, work-related detriment or
economic injury. Chamberlin v. 101
Realty, Inc., 915 F.2d 777, 783 (1st
Cir. 1990)(plaintiff in a quid pro
quo harassment case must show
that his or her reaction to advances
affected tangible aspects of compen-
(Continued on Page 478)
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sation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment); Spencer v.
General Electric Co., 894 F.2d 651,
658 (4th Cir. 1990) (same); Ellert v.
Ulniversitv of Texas, Dallas, 52 F.3d
543 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); Sauers v.
Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122
(10th Cir. 1993) (same); Sparks v.
Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830
F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987) (same);
Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391 (D.C.
Cir. 1995) (same). In these courts, if
a plaintiff cannot show a supervi-
sor's sexual harassment had tangible
effects on the terms and conditions
of employment, the misconduct is
actionable only as hostile-environ-
ment sexual harassment.
Resolving the disagreement over
the proper standard of liability in
quid pro quo sexual-harassment
suits is important to both employees
and employers. If the Supreme
Court affirms the Seventh Circuit's
decision and holds that unfulfilled
retaliatory threats can constitute
quid pro quo sexual harassment, it
will be expanding greatly the num-
ber of sexual-harassment claims
brought under that theory. Many
claims previously advanced under
the negligence standard associated
with hostile-environment sexual
harassment will be transformed into
strict liability quid pro quo cases




For Burlington Industries, Inc.
(James J. Casey; Ross & Hardies;
(312) 558-1000).
For Kimberly B. Ellerth (Ernest T.
Rossiello; (312) 346-8920).
AMIcus BRIEFS
In support of Burlington
Industries, Inc.
Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America (Counsel
of Record: Carol Connor Flowe;
Plotkin & Kahn; (202) 857-6000);
Equal Employment Advisory
Council (Counsel of Record: Ann
Elizabeth Reesman; McGuiness &
Williams; (202) 789-8600).
Issue No. 7
